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Abstract In this paper, I address the issue of scientific modelling in contemporary
linguistics, focusing on the generative tradition. In so doing, I identify two common
varieties of linguistic idealisation, which I call determination and isolation respec-
tively. I argue that these distinct types of idealisation can both be described within the
remit of Weisberg’s (J Philos 104(12):639–659, 2007) minimalist idealisation strat-
egy in the sciences. Following a line set by Blutner (Theor Linguist, 37(1–2):27–35,
2011) (albeit for different purposes), I propose this minimalist idealisation analysis
for a broad construal of the generative linguistic programme and thus cite examples
from a wide range of linguistic frameworks including early generative syntax (i.e.
Standard Theory, Government and Binding and Principles and Parameters), Mini-
malism (Chomsky in The minimalist program, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1995), the
parallel architecture (Jackendoff in Foundations of language: brain, meaning, gram-
mar, evolution, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002) and optimality theory (Prince
and Smolensky in Optimality theory: constraint interaction in generative grammar,
1993/2004). Lastly, I claim that from a modelling perspective, the dynamic turn in
syntax (Kempson et al. in Dynamic syntax—the flow of language understanding,
Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 2001; Cann et al. in The dynamics of language: an
introduction, Elsevier, Oxford, 2005) can be explained as a continuation, as opposed
to amarked shift (or revolution), of the generative modelling paradigm (despite radical
theory change). Seen in this light, my proposal is an even broader construal of the gen-
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erative tradition, along scientific modelling lines. Thus, I offer a lens through which to
appreciate the scientific contribution of generative grammar, amid an increased resis-
tance to some of its core theoretical posits, in terms of a brand of structural realism in
the philosophy of science and specifically scientific modelling.
Keywords Models ·Generative grammar ·Dynamic syntax · Idealisation ·Philosophy
of science
1 Introduction
The generative tradition in linguistics took the form of a scientific revolution in the
middle of the twentieth century. The techniques and methodology which came along
with the movement claimed to place the study of language at the level of an empirical,
naturalistic science which would eventually be subsumed by biology or neurophysi-
ology. Since this time, arguments have been proffered which challenged this claim on
ontological grounds (Katz 1981; Carr 1990; Katz and Postal 1991), methodological
grounds (Soames 1984; Hintikka 1999; Devitt 2006) and linguistic grounds from the
various competing frameworks, some of which were spawned from the initial gener-
ative approach (Pustejovsky 1995; Prince and Smolensky 1993/2004; Kempson et al.
2001; Jackendoff 2002).
In this paper, I take no position on the scientific status of linguistics or its onto-
logical underpinnings. I do, however, offer a lens through which to appreciate the
scientific contribution of the generative tradition in linguistics (whether or not it is
deemed to be a “science” at the end of the day). This account is in terms of the spe-
cific type of modelling practice that this framework brought to the study of natural
language(s), namely minimalist models idealisation (Weisberg 2007). This is a type
of modelling that is ubiquitous in the hard sciences such as physics and chemistry.
I use the above claim to provide an explanation of how the diverse and compet-
ing approaches to linguistics, specifically of the dynamic variety (Kempson et al.
2001), are related to the generative one and a continuation (as opposed to a revo-
lution) of the modelling strategies of the initial scientific revolution in linguistics. I
argue that the generative tradition can thus be appreciated for ushering this type of
modelling practice into the study of language and more broadly construed in terms of
it.
This analysis does not presuppose any evaluative benefits or disadvantages of spe-
cific modelling trends, nor does it offer comments to that effect. In addition, it does not
aim to exhaustively capture all the modelling strategies employed by linguists, only
some of the salient ones.
In the first section, I discuss modelling in the sciences with a focus on the notion of
minimalist idealisation inmodel-building. This is by nomeans an attempt at a compre-
hensive account of the vast and diverse philosophical terrain of scientific modelling,
of which I have no intention (or need) to charter at this time. In the next section, I
attempt to provide an analysis of linguistic modelling in terms of minimalist ideal-
isation, drawing from the core tenets of the generative programme from the initial
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Standard Theory (1965) to Minimalism (1995).1 I identify two types of idealisation,
namely determination and isolation, both of which I argue are species of minimal-
ist idealisation (Weisberg 2007, not to be confused with Minimalism in Generative
Grammar). In Sect. 4, I attempt to extend this analysis to the dynamic turn in syntax
and other related frameworks such as Optimality Theory and the Parallel Architecture.
In the penultimate section, I discuss frameworks and types of frameworks which do
not build their linguistic models by means of minimalist idealisation. Lastly, I revisit
the issue of why the modelling perspective is particularly illuminating in the case of
contemporary linguistics.
2 Modelling and idealisation
The first question to ask is ‘why modelling’? There are various methods involved
in scientific theorising and modelling is just one particular subset of these methods.
A beginning of an answer can be provided by appreciating how modelling differs
from other types of theorising. As the term suggests, the theorist starts with a model
or an indirect representation of the target system. In this case natural language. She
then describes the model assuming that given its resemblance to the target system,
the descriptions will be true of (or useful to understanding) the target system itself.
Therefore, in what follows, I will be assuming that a grammar is a model of natural
language or select portions of it (I will readdress this issue in Sects. 3 and 8).
Scientific modelling is a burgeoning field within the philosophy of science. The
idealisations and abstractions involved in modelling have been argued to be pervasive
in the sciences and seem to inform and shape much theorising in fields from physics to
biology (see Van Fraasen 1980; Cartwright 1983; Suppe 1989). In this section, I will
focus on idealisation as it plays a central role within the modern linguistic approach
to natural language.
The terms ‘idealisation’ and ‘abstraction’ are sometimes used interchangeably in
the literature. I will follow Thomson-Jones (2005) in distinguishing between these
concepts. Thus, idealisations involve misrepresentation of the target system or spe-
cific aspects of it, while abstractions merely omit certain factors. “[W]e should take
idealization to require the assertion of a falsehood, and take abstraction to involve
the omission of a truth” (Thomson-Jones 2005, p. 175). Thomson-Jones cites Chom-
sky’s invocation of an ideal speaker-listener in the study of linguistic competence as
1 In terms of terminology, I will follow the framework outlined byKuipers (2007) for the sciences generally
and used by Tomalin (2010) for the development of generative linguistics. In this framework, there is a
hierarchy of scientific categories roughly as follows. At the top are (1) research traditions, e.g. Generative
Linguistics itself (including phonology, syntax etc.), which are instantiated by (2) research programmes such
as generative grammar (further subdivided into Standard and Extended Standard Theory, Minimalism etc.)
or the parallel architecture, optimality theorywhich in turn have (3) core theories (such as syntactocentricism
or recursion) and finally (4) specific theories of particular phenomena which share core theoretical tenets.
“This seems reasonable since the phrase ‘generative grammar’ is standardly used to refer to different theories
of generative syntax that have been proposed during the period 1950s-present, and, given this, it would be
misleading to classify GG as being simply a ‘theory’ (Tomalin 2010, p. 317)”.
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a canonical case of idealisation.2 Another case of idealisation is Fisher’s Principle in
evolutionary biology that states that the sex ratio of most animal species is 1:1 based
on a hypothetical model which postulates a fictitious three-sex organism.
At first glance, this definition of idealisation might seem at odds with standard
semantic accounts of modelling, such as Giere (1988), which assume resemblance
relations (often in the form of morphisms) between the model and the target system.
However, the idea of resemblance relations still holds even in an extreme case such as
the Fisher model, in the form of a hidden ceteris paribus clause. We assume that all
other factors of the biological world are held constant for the distortion or idealisation
to explain the evolutionary stability (or evolutionary stable strategy, ESS) of the 1:1 sex
ratio. In thisway it resembles a reductio or constructive proof in logic andmathematics,
in which the laws of logic (such as noncontradiction) are held constant while an absurd
hypothesis is entertained (and eventually rejected). We will return to the issue of
explanation and ceteris paribus hedges briefly in the next section.
As previously mentioned, for Godfrey-Smith, “the modeler’s strategy is to gain
understanding of a complex real-world system via an understanding of simpler, hypo-
thetical system that resembles it in relevant respects” (2006, p. 726). The important
phrase here is “in relevant respects”. The relevant features of the real world which
the model resembles might not be the properties which we are aiming to explain
directly, these could be distorted if the model resembles the target system in other
respects. In fact, it is unclear how idealisation would operate if there were no resem-
blances at all between the models and reality. Imagine a distortion or idealisation
inserted into a system which in no way resembles the real world or the laws of nature.
Not only would it be extremely difficult to predict the effect of such a distortion
but it would be unclear as to the role of its introduction in an otherwise distorted
world.
Of course, idealisations may be introduced for a variety of reasons. Weisberg
(2007, p. 641) identifies a common type of idealisation in the hard sciences called
“Galilean idealisation” which introduces distortions for the sake of computational
tractability. A frictionless plane in physics is often referenced as a case of such an ide-
alisation. No such thing exists in the real world and yet the idealisation is extremely
useful in theoretical and applied mechanics. Formal language theory in linguistics
possesses similar idealisations. In this field, natural languages are taken to be sets
of uninterpreted strings organised according to their complexity. Of course, no nat-
ural language is wholly uninterpreted, but this idealisation is essential for much of
the work done in computational linguistics and the construction of various gram-
mar formalisms. Before moving on to the nature of linguistic idealisations such
as these, let us consider what role they might play in the explanation of linguistic
phenomena.
2 “Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous
speech-community, who knows its (the speech community’s) language perfectly and is unaffected by such
grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest,
and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of this language in actual performance.”
(Chomsky 1965, p. 4).
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3 How the laws of linguistics might lie
In the philosophy of physics, Cartwright (1983) famously argued that the explanatory
power of the fundamental laws of physics lies precisely in their falsehood. Her sim-
ulacrum account of explanation relies on the idea that the fundamental laws are not
strictly true of observable reality but only true of highly idealised objects of scientific
models. Reference to these latter objects are usually prefaced with ceteris paribus
clauses which impose conditions never actually fulfilled in the phenomenal world (or
the world of appearances, surface form in linguistics). On this view, models occupy a
central explanatory role, i.e. “to explain a phenomenon is to construct a model that fits
the phenomenon into a theory” (Cartwright 1983, p. 17). Intriguing though this idea
might be, it is generally considered to be quite a contentious matter in the philoso-
phy of science and physics [see Elgin and Sober (2002) for a reversal of Cartwright’s
conclusions].
Nevertheless, in the case of linguistics this account seems somewhat more applica-
ble. The Conceptualism (or Mentalism) upon which the generative programme is
based seeks ultimately to explain linguistic laws (or rules of the grammars) in terms
of biological or neurobiological reality. Thus, linguistic models, which are constituted
by abstract grammar rules, are not true of real world languages (which rarely met the
requirements of such rules inviolably) and it is not even clear how they could be true of
actual neurobiological states (which involve neural processes and synaptic connections
etc.). The explanatory power of linguistic theories lies in the rules of the grammars of
idealised languages, or I-languages (thus, adding an ‘I’ to the usual definition).
In this way, the rules of generative grammars can be characterised as one of Stain-
ton’s (2014) options for an explanation of the field in stating that “the practice is
sloppy, loose talk—which is strictly speaking false, and will eventually have to be
reconstructed as corresponding truths about mental states and processes” (8).3 Ignor-
ing the pejorative connotations of the previous statement, the competence-performance
distinction which rests on the idealisation of a perfect linguistic community, incapable
of error, further suggests that this picture might not be inappropriate for the rules
of generative grammar. Whether or not we adopt an additional idealisation of core
grammar to which the rules apply4 or the faculty of language narrowly construed (á
la Chomsky et al. 2002), the rules or laws of linguistics are not strictly true of surface
expressions but rather of highly idealised and internalised linguistic structures of the
grammars. In addition, generativists are insistent that grammar rules do not pertain to
expressions of public languages or E-languages but rather to the I-languages which
in turn stand proxy for mental states and eventually brain-states to be explained by
neuroscience. They are similarly insistent that the requisite cognitive and neurolog-
ical structural realisations are forthcoming. Thus, the laws of linguistics might be
be doubly mendacious (again not in a pejorative sense), in firstly being directed at
explaining idealised structures of idealised communities of cognisers and secondly in
suggesting as candidate targets of the models mere place-holders for later biological
3 He eventually goes on to reject this interpretation of generative linguistics.
4 See Pullum (1983) for problems with the core grammar postulate.
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instantiation. This is different from the usual taxonomy assumed in the sciences since
chemical or biological generalisations are not usually assumed to be reducible to the
generalisations of physics but rather produce their own genuine level of explanation.
In the following section, I will delve deeper into the nature of linguistic idealisation
and show that it is a variant of modelling strategies used in the other sciences and
thus the goal of eventual biological incorporation might not be unrealistic. In this way,
the explanations involved in the models of linguistics can be shown to be related to
those of the other sciences while retaining some aspects of the idea that linguistics is
distinctive in its scientific status.
4 Minimalist idealisation from ST to minimalism
In this section, I investigate two kinds of idealisation both aimed at discovering the
minimal causal basis responsible for a particular property or phenomenon of the target
system. It is an idealisation in the sense I have been using, in that the models make
no attempt to represent the target phenomenon in its complete state or “de-idealise”
to include extracted phenomena. In other words, we misrepresent the target system
as involving only the core causal factors we deem necessary for the explanation or
generation of a given phenomenon or property. Weisberg (2007) describes minimal-
ist idealisation as “the practice of constructing and studying theoretical models that
include only the core causal factors which give rise to a phenomenon” or “put more
explicitly, a minimalist model contains only those factors thatmake a difference to the
occurrence and essential character of the phenomenon in question” (Weisberg 2007,
p. 642). If this weremere omission, thenwewould be able to reintroduce the abstracted
phenomenon into the model.
Consider the frictionless plane example again in mechanics. If we include friction
(or fluid/air resistance) into the model, the predictions will fail, since these forces
result in a loss of energy and thus a loss in speed and acceleration among other things.
Admittedly, these elements are reintroducable into the system (and perhaps indicative
of Galilean idealisation). A better example of minimalist idealisation is presented in
Weisberg (2013, p. 100).
A classic example of a minimalist model in the physical sciences is the one-
dimensional Ising model. This simple model represents atoms, molecules, or
other particles as points along a line and allows these points to be in one of two
states. Originally, Ernst Ising developed this model to investigate the ferromag-
netic properties of metals. It was further developed and extended to study many
other phenomena of interest involving phase changes and critical phenomena.
The generative tradition was largely motivated by such modelling practices,
specifically through two versions of minimalist modelling, which I call minimal
determination and isolation respectively. A similar genesis is attributed to generative
grammar by Tomalin (2006) who provides strong evidence that, following Goodman
(and Quine), Chomsky took principles of economy and simplicity to be constitutive
of the process of grammar construction.
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From the very beginning, then, Chomsky seems to have been persuaded that
considerations of simplicity were intimately involved in the processes of gram-
mar construction […] With particular reference to syntactic theory, one of the
implications of Goodman’s views concerning the critical importance of simplic-
ity criteria in constructional systems is that the reasons for wanting a grammar
to be as simple as possible are the same as for wanting a grammar at all (113).
The strategy is the same as that described by Weisberg concerning minimalist
idealisation or in which “[t]heorists often begin a project by trying to determine what
kind of minimal structures could generate a property of interest” (2007, p. 650). In
addition, Chomsky himself acknowledged the role of modelling and idealisation (as I
have defined it) in the linguistic process as integral as early as Syntactic Structures.
Precisely constructed models for linguistic structure can play an important role,
both negative and positive, in the process of discovery itself. By pushing a precise
but inadequate formulation to unacceptable conclusion, we can often expose the
exact source of this inadequacy and, consequently, gain a deeper understanding
of the linguistic data (1957, p. 5).
Before moving on to a more thorough discussion of minimalist idealisation prac-
tices, I shall state (following Blutner 2011) five core characteristics of the generative
programme in linguistics.5 It should be noted that these characteristics do not form a
necessary and sufficient set or definition at the level of research tradition but rather a
guide to the theoretical underpinnings of subsequent research programmes and how
different specific theories developed from core theories or propositions in the sense
of Kuipers (2007) (see footnote 1). The consequence of a complete characterisation
(in term of (1)–(5) below) at the research tradition level would be tantamount to the
exclusion of Syntactic Structures from the generative tradition. Needless to say, any
characterisation of generative research tradition which banishes this founding text
would be impoverished at best.6
1. Autonomy of Syntax: The methodological posit that the core “generative” compo-
nent in natural language production is the computational systemwhich produces the
set of grammatical expressions. This system operates independently of the seman-
tic, pragmatic and phonological components of the grammar (or in Blutner’s words
“there exists an encapsulated system of purely formal generalizations orthogonal
to generalizations governing meaning or discourse” (2011, p. 27).
2. Universal Grammar: The claim that despite surface differences between theworld’s
languages, there is a set of genetically endowed linguistic universals common to
all possible human languages (developments such as the Principles and Parameters
framework allow for external linguistic input to shape the initial settings of the
grammar).7
5 Although I have substituted his third tenet for the Universal Grammar postulate and my description of
the rule-based view is somewhat different to his description of it.
6 I thank an anonymous referee for cautioning me on this point.
7 There is a distinction between the idea that there are universal typological properties which are common
to all natural languages (in surface syntax, morphology etc.) [for instance, the wealth of research which
flowed from Greenberg (1963)], and the claim that there are underlying universal principles of human
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3. Innateness Hypothesis: A rationalistic approach to natural language acquisition in
which human infants are endowedwith a linguistic systemprior to encountering any
input. Often motivated by the “poverty of stimilus” argument [for some interesting
empirical support for innate linguistic biases in child language acquisition, see
Culbertson and Adger (2014) and Culbertson and Newport (2015)].
4. Competence-performance distinction: Linguistic theory is concerned with an ideal
linguistic competence and not necessarily with the various aspects of performance
or actual parsing and processing in real-time.
5. Rule-based Representationalism: This is the view that the posits of the grammatical
theory or rules of the grammar are actual features of the human agent or ‘cognizer’
(actual goings-on in her mind/brain) at some level of deep neurophysiological
embedding. To ‘know’ or have a language on this view is to have subconscious
(tacit or implicit) access to these rules.
Blutner goes on to argue that a broad construal of the generative programme in
terms of these aspects (or similar ones) should encompass frameworks such as Jack-
endoff’s architecture of the language faculty, Pustejovsky’s generative lexicon and the
optimality theory of Prince and Smolensky. Importantly for my purpose, the dynamic
syntax framework rejects many (if not, all) of these tenets outright and therefore I
believe that the extension of this approach under the auspices of the generative tradi-
tion itself cannot follow the same lines as Blutner proposes for the other frameworks.
In other words, the dynamic programme constitutes a genuine core theory change. I
do not intend to dispute this point or argue that dynamic syntax is generative syntax
in disguise. Rather, I propose an even broader construal of the generative tradition,
along scientific modelling lines. This analysis maintains the broad construal of Blut-
ner’s proposal but extends it in terms of modelling strategies as opposed to theoretical
posits, i.e. generative linguists and dynamic linguists (and linguists of the other gen-
erative persuasions) build their models in similar ways, using similar strategies. It is
on to these strategies that the next section moves, while in Sect. 7, I also mention
contemporary frameworks which do not follow these practices.
4.1 Minimal determination
Minimal determination is perhaps the most explicit version of minimalist modelling in
linguistics. One criticism of the pre-Chomskyan linguistic paradigm (the Structural-
ism of Bloomfield, Hockett and others) was its alleged inability to explain linguistic
creativity (see Searle 1974). By focusing on statistical or classificatory aspects of
specific corpora (of actual speech), this approach limited itself to dealing with finite
tokens of natural language and thus could not account for the linguistic creativity or
the idea that we possess a capacity for indefinite linguistic novelty in both production
and comprehension.
Footnote 7 continued
language which are relevant to explaining phenomena such as language acquisition. GG is only committed
to the latter. I thank an anonymous reviewer for stressing the need for clarification here.
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It was in drawing inspiration from computability theory that the early generative
tradition placed the notion of a generative grammar (subclass of a Post-canonical sys-
tem or Turing machine) at the forefront of the discipline. The idea was to capture the
discretely infinite set of expressions of natural language via finite means. In the Stan-
dard Theory (1957–1965) or ST, phrase-structure rules performed this task. Certain
rules allow for recursive structures in terms of embedding or self-reference, such as
simple rules for coordination ‘N P → N P and N P’ or more complex rules such as
‘S → N P V P’ and ‘V P → V S’ for embedded sentences. Think of this as a loop in
a push-down automaton [the class of automata associated with context-free (CFG) or
phrase structure grammars (PSG)]which allows for unbounded iteration and thus a dis-
cretely infinite set of new expressions, e.g. Thabo is intelligent; [Thabo is intelligent]
and [Thabo is brave]; [Thabo is intelligent] and [[Thabo is brave] and [Thabo is short]]
etc. or ‘Sipho said that [Lungi mentioned that [Thato believed that p]].8 The product of
the phrase structure rules (or rewrite operations) contributes to the deep structure
or underlying syntactic form. This structure feeds into the transformational com-
ponent of the grammar which is responsible for surface forms of expressions (through
movement and deletion). ST was a progression on the purely classificatory notion
of transformational grammar of Harris (1951) and Chomsky’s own more derivational
view in Syntactic Structures (1957) with the addition of a lexical component or lexicon
which received input from the phrase structure and inserted lexical items into the deep
structure. Kernel sentences, simple declaratives devoid of any modification which can
be combined to form complex sentences, were also eschewed in favour of deep struc-
ture which could represent surface forms more minimally. This framework affirms
the fourth tenet of the generative programme, namely the competence-performance
distinction. “ST does not attempt to answer the questions of language perception and
production […] rather than directly relating meaning and expression, it relates them
indirectly, through deep structure.” (Langendoen 1998, p. 242). A direct relation (or
determining relation) of meaning to expression is a matter of a performance grammar
on this view and thus outside of the scope of linguistic theory.
ST, I claim, involves an example of minimal determination in the rewrite rules
of the phrase-structure. In order to explain the creative aspect of natural language
(or the specific examples of iterative structures such as conjunction and adjectival
8 Recursion is a tendentious topic in theoretical linguistics. It is not my intention to be embroiled in that
controversy here, although I will offer some comment on the topic in Sect. 8. The core idea is that recursive
functions introduce a property of self-reference. This usually involves two steps. One which specifies the
condition of termination of the recursion or the base case and the recursive step which reduces all other cases
to the base. The Fibonacci sequence and factorial functions are examples of this procedure, so too is Bar-
Hillel’s (1953) definition of a grammatical French sentence [see Tomalin (2006) for further discussion].
In fact, the examples cited above are not ‘perfect’ cases of recursion as the subordinate clauses are not
technically “contained” in the larger structure. Centre-embeddings might be more illustrative in this case.
For the controversy surrounding the history of this specific construction see Sampson (2001). The general
class under which centre-embedding is subsumed is so-called ‘nested recursion’ as in [The man [the boy
[the girl kissed] hit] filed a complaint] (van Hulst 2010, p. xxiv). Again, it is questionable whether or not
such constructions naturally occur in language (see Karlsson 2010). However, the term ‘recursion’ has been
used in a variety of ways in linguistics [see Tomalin (2007) and Lobina (2010) for an extension of these
uses] so much so that iterative constructions and embeddings are not clearly distinguishable purely on the
grounds of recursive characterisation.
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modification), i.e. the property of interest, we postulate a finite set of rules which
allow for recursive structure and thus for infinite expression. The rule formulation
is not descriptive but rather generative in the sense that it is supposed to represent
multiple structures and with recursive elements potentially infinite structures. There
are other ways to account for creativity. For instance, we could argue that we have
a very large set of stored linguistic expressions (wholesale, not piecemeal) and we
instantiate these expressions when prompted by experience [see Evans (1981) for a
comparison between the two methods]. However, this explanation would not be a
case of minimalist idealisation in the same way that assuming we possess a finite rule
system capable of infinite output is. The definition I propose can be stated in this
way:9
Minimal determination: The explanation of a complex linguistic phenomenon or prop-
erty is provided by a model which includes only the interaction of the smallest
possible units underlying the phenomenon/property.
The above suggests an explanatory dimension to the modelling of a given phe-
nomenon via the least possible units. In fact, the syntacto-centrism itself (tenet 1)
of the generative programme can be understood in terms of minimal determina-
tion. Syntax is claimed there to be the single “generative engine” of the language
faculty as opposed to multiple such mechanisms. The idea is that we understand
‘determination’ in linguistics to be a means of providing explanations to causal
questions. For example, if we want to explain why language users are prone to
judging certain kinds of sentences (displaying certain kinds of syntactic structure)
as felicitous or not (grammatical), then we do so by stipulating the least amount
of rules (of only a particular kind) which generate that type of sentence to model
this behaviour. Thus, the rules of the grammar/model facilitate knowledge of the
real world system through idealised models. The actual output of linguistic com-
petence need not be infinite in reality. This is similar to when physicists explain
the superconducting properties of certain metals via the Bardeen–Cooper–Schrieffer
model which involves phase transitions and a thermodynamic limit, i.e. the non-
veridical postulation of infinite particles. Infinity is assumed in the model to make
certain predictions and characterisations simpler. This latter model may be an obvi-
ous candidate for idealisation but even less abstact examples can suffice to show that
“the endeavor is explanation; the feature of idealization […] is the deliberate fal-
sification of the causal workings of the system whose behavior is to be explained”
(Strevens 2007, p. 1). Strevens describes how Boyle’s Law is usually accompanied by
a “causally distorting explanation” which involves ignoring the long range attractive
forces between molecules and the collisions they exhibit inter alia. Similar ideali-
sation is involved in explaining linguistic phenomena on this account. For instance,
garden path phenomena (as in the example below) are notoriously difficult to parse
by real speakers, yet they do correspond to syntactic rules, as in the famous case
below.
9 Of course, in many frameworks such as the Parallel Architecture and Dynamic Syntax, sets of stored
expressions are included in the grammar in terms of idioms, quotations, songs etc. There is nothing incom-
patible with stored expressions and compositional grammar rules in principle.
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1. The horse raced past the barn fell.
The rules of the grammar do not strictly correspond to speaker judgements in these
cases but rather, following Cartwright, they correspond to the idealised structure that is
the speaker’s I-language or state of the language faculty. They are true of amodel. Thus,
the model/grammar is not a direct representation of the target system, since speakers
tend not to be able to parse these sentences effectively or immediately despite their
grammaticality.
The Extended Standard Theory or EST of the 70’s (Chomsky 1973; Jackendoff
1977), introduced furtherminimalist idealisations into the generative approach.On this
account, the phrase-structure rules are simplified even further to account for a broader
range of linguistic universals (or phrasal categories) through the binary branching of
the X-bar theory. In contrast to the many phrase structure rules of transformational
grammar and ST, we now have only three types of rules which generate all the requisite
structures. The three rules are (1) a specifier, (2) an adjunct and (3) a complement rule,
represented respectively below (where X ′ is a head-variable and X P,Y P, Z P,WP
are arbitrary phrasal categories determined by that head).
1. Specifier rule: X P → (Y P)X ′ or X P → X ′(Y P)
2. Adjunct rule: X ′ → X ′(Z P) or X ′ → (Z P)X ′
3. Complement rule: X ′ → X (WP) or X ′ → (WP)X
In contrast to the redundancy of phrase-structure rules, X-bar theory vastly overgen-
erates the grammatical or well-formed linguistic structures and needs to be reined in
by various other devices (such as theta-grids etc.). But themove is minimalist nonethe-
less. “As first suggested by Chomsky (1970) […] we might be able to eliminate the
redundancy and increase our explanatory power by generalizing the phrase-structure
rules” (Poole 2002, p. 47). It is also an idealisation in the sense discussed above. Once
again, themodel of grammar homes in on theminimal causal basis necessary for gram-
matical representation. In addition, we move closer to an account which respects the
innate structure of the language faculty, the third core characteristic of the generative
approach (mentioned in Sect. 4). In Aspects of the theory of Syntax (1965), Chomsky
differentiates between three nested kinds of adequacy conditions for a theory of gram-
mar, each more inclusive than the last. The three related linguistic desiderata are (1)
observable linguistic performance, (2) native speaker judgements and (3) language
acquisition. The first is the class of observationally adequate grammars which are
those grammars which only account for corpora or observed utterances of speech.
Naturally, these do not give us much traction on (2) and (3). Chomsky then suggests
a class of descriptively adequate grammars (DAGs) which aim to capture the psy-
chological facts of native speaker intuitions, thereby addressing (1) and (2). However,
these latter grammars are inadequate on count (3) and thus require us to ascend to
the level of explanatorily adequate grammars. By minimising the set of rules which
learners have to acquire, we approach the explanatory adequacy necessary for a story
about language acquisition.
[L]inguistics was supposed to be embeddable into cognitive science more
broadly. But if this is the case then there is a concern about the unchecked pro-
liferation of rules-such rule systems might be descriptively adequate, but they
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would fail to account for how we acquire a language-specific grammar (Ludlow
2011, p. 15).
The X-bar innovation also pulled in the direction of universality as the new grammar
rules or schemata could represent a greater number of tree (or hierarchical) structures
and thus capture more of the constituents of a greater number of world languages,
again with minimal resources. As per the definition of minimalist idealisation, we are
only interested in the core causal factors involved in grammatical production, i.e. the
models of ST and EST only contain these factors. In the opposite direction, Newmeyer
(2002) describes the generative semantics project as attempting to model too much
and his words are particularly illuminating within the scope of the current section.
The dynamic that led generative semantics to abandon explanation flowed irrev-
ocably from its practice of regarding any speaker judgement and any fact
about morpheme distribution as a de facto matter for grammatical analysis […]
Attributing the same theoretical weight to each and every fact about language
had disastrous consequences (121).
Another way of putting this is that the models were moving from minimalist ideali-
sations to more comprehensive representations of the target systems (often including
pragmatic phenomena such as implicature). In the next section, I describe another
variety of minimalist idealisation modelling, one which, I think, is crucially involved
in both the Government and Binding (1981) and Minimalist (1995) approaches.
4.2 Isolation
Natural language, and the linguistics which attempts to study it, is a diverse object
of inquiry. Any theory which aims at a comprehensive account of its nature has to
acknowledge the diverse factors involved in its explanation. When discussing syntax,
semantic considerations invariably enter into certain descriptions (often captured by
selectional restrictions on lexical items), when doing semantics, phonological aspects
can be relevant (e.g. prosody) or pragmatic features (implicature, context shifting,
metaphor, sarcasm etc.). Standard generative grammar places syntax at the centre of
the language faculty and banishes these other aspects to various post-computational
spell-outs or logical form. However, some proponents, such as Jackendoff in his Paral-
lel Architecture (2002), jettison the syntacto-centric account and describe the language
faculty as involving multiple generative mechanisms and interface principles between
them. Dynamic syntax too rejects the centrality of syntax but goes one step further
than Jackendoff in rejecting its autonomy likewise. The models of the generative tradi-
tion aim not only to identify the minimal properties which “determine” (in the causal
sense of produce) the intended aspect of the target system but also the relevant causes
involved in this determination. This is where isolation comes in. Isolation is the mod-
elling strategy which involves isolating or separating out the specific types of causal
explanations deemed relevant to the phenomenon we are interested in producing.
The scientific modelling involved in generative linguistics often includes a property
known as “modularity”. Modularity is the property of a system which involves sepa-
rating it into discrete, individual subsystems which contribute to the system’s overall
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organisation and operation. Isolation is similarly the technique of building models
of these separate subsystems independently of one another (or as much as possible).
One can think of it as the modelling technique which corresponds to the property of
modularity.10 So the definition, I offer, is as follows:
Isolation: The separation of a system into distinct minimal causal models for
the determination of separate (but potentially related) properties or families of
properties.11
This type of idealisation not only involves compartmentalising causal explanations
but also potentially neglecting certain relevant causal factors outside of a givenmodule.
For instance, in an economic model of national GDP, one could exclude the contri-
bution of a particular industry or sector (say, the value of production in the textile
industry) even if this industry does in fact contribute to overall GDP. Stabler (2011)
describes the competence-performance idealisation of Aspects in a similar way. “That
is, we aim to find domains with causal interactions that are relatively closed, domains
that can be described relatively autonomously” (2011, p. 69). I argue that Government
and Binding or GB (Chomsky 1981) can be described in terms of such a modelling
strategy. In this theory, separate modules govern separate aspects of the syntax (and
semantics). As before, the minimalist idealisations identify an even smaller set of
properties (for maximum generality). For example, there are only three core levels
of the grammar on this account, namely D-structure, S-Structure and Logical Form.
S-structure is derived from D-structure and logical form in turn from S-structure. The
latter derivation is governed by a single move alpha transformation at both the D
to S-structure level and the S-structure to LF level (as opposed to a vast number of
separate movement operations in ST and EST).
Importantly, theGB framework distinguishes seven separatemodules which govern
or generate different aspects of the grammar, in line with the initial autonomy of
syntax thesis (tenet 1 above). The phenomena in question might involve multiple
modules interacting but are explained within their distinct causal modules (as in the
hypothetical GDP case above). One important application of the government relation
involves the notion of abstract case, such as nominative, accusative, dative and so
on (considered to be a universal property common to all languages, although often
unrealised in surface morphology). Governance (which is a relation between heads
and their phrasal categories, involving the dominance relation of m-command) also
interacts with theta-theory which encodes semantic and functional roles such as agent,
patient etc. However, Case theory and theta-theory do not necessarily coincide, despite
being related causal explanations for various phenomena. For example, in the Latin
10 This is a somewhat more general account of “modularity” than is found in the canonical cognitive
science literature, such as Fodor (1983) or Pylyshyn (1984). This is because modularity is posited as a
genuine property of a system or set of systems. Hence the claims usually associated with it such as domain
specificity and inaccessibility. Isolation, on the other hand, is an idealising technique used in the service of
model-building.
11 Mäki (2011) and Portides (2013) discuss isolation in models as well. Although their analyses involve
conceptual omission or “screening off” of features of an actual system. They differ in that Mäki considers
the isolation as a result while Portides considers it as a process within the model construction. In this way,
my conception is closer to Portides’. I do not, however, include a conceptual act within my characterisation.
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sentence below, both the theta-grid of the verb ‘to give’ or dare and the case of the
indirect object requires/selects for a dative noun form of Brutus.
(i) Caesar Bruto dedit pecuniam. (Caesar gave the money to Brutus)
In GB these explanations are independent of one another. The idealisations of the
theta-theory do not include those of the case theory, or rather they offer orthogonal
minimal causal structures to explain the occurrence of the indirect object ‘Bruto’. In
GB, Chomsky describes the overall grammar in the following way (which exemplifies
isolation idealisation).
The system that is emerging is highlymodular, in the sense that the full complex-
ity of observed phenomena is traced to the interaction of partially independent
subtheories, each with its own abstract structure (1981, p. 135).
Finally, the “minimalist program” or MP, as perhaps the name suggests, provides
the most radical case of minimalist idealisation at work. MP is often described as
a programme or approach as opposed to a distinct theory on the same level as GB
or the Parallel Architecture. Within the terminology of this paper, perhaps the term
“research tradition” might be more apt, although I think the framework dances on the
line between tradition and programme at times.
Minimalism isn’t itself a theory of the language faculty that as such would or
could compete with other such theories. No matter one’s theoretical persuasion,
a minimalist strategy of linguistic explanation is something one can choose to
be interested in or not (Hinzen 2012, p. 95).
Thus, in many ways, MP is the canonical case of a modelling strategy as I have
described it. In MP, we start our models with only what we “must take to be true” and
then rebuild the system from this basis. Once again, we see the concept of minimal
determination described in the previous section. In terms of isolation, MP maintains
the generative tradition’s separation between form and function (or competence and
performance). In other words, the structure of the language faculty is independent of
its communicative role. Furthermore, the communicative or functional aspects of the
grammar are isolated from the formal features which have an alternative causal basis
and role within a theory of grammar.
Previously we discussed Chomsky’s notions of descriptive and explanatory ade-
quacy. In MP, a level ‘beyond explanatory adequacy’ (also called ‘natural adequacy’)
is introduced. The goal of linguistic theory now becomes to explain language as a
“natural object” (in the sense of being bound by the biological and physical universe,
as opposed to the mathematical and conventional ones).
In principle, then, we can seek a level of explanation deeper than explanatory
adequacy, asking not only what the properties of language are, but why they are
that way (Chomsky 2004).
InMP, language is considered to be a perfect system, optimally designed in terms of
“virtual conceptual necessity” or “general considerations of simplicity, elegance, and
economy” (Chomsky 1995). Thus, the grammar (or narrow syntax) constitutes a per-
fect computational system via economy principles for syntax and semantics (economy
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of derivation and economy of representation, respectively). In this way, Minimalism
can be viewed as an account of what kind of models should be built in order to reflect
the assumed design features of natural language (such as those above). Lappin et al.
(2000) argue that both perfection and optimality are unclear notions in this framework
and should constitute serious challenges to MP’s adoption by those linguists working
within the GB framework. In terms of my dialectic, the difference between GB and
MP is especially illuminating.
Throughout the modern history of generative grammar, the problem of deter-
mining the character of FL [faculty of language] has been approached “from top
down” [as in GB framework]: How much must be attributed to UG to account
for language acquisition? The MP seeks to approach the problem “from bottom
up”: How little can be attributed to UG while still accounting for the variety
of I-languages [internalised language or specific state of the language faculty]
attained, relyingon third factor principles?The twoapproaches should, of course,
converge, and should interact in the course of pursuing a common goal. (Chom-
sky 2008, p. 4).
Chomsky’s distinction between “top down” and “bottom up” is not entirely clear.
It can be, however, related to a topic in the theoretical physics and chemistry con-
cerning what is referred to as “foundational” versus “phenomenological” approaches.
The latter are the various frameworks such as GB, ST and the principles and para-
meters (P&P) which offer specific analyses of linguistic phenomena, what we have
been calling research programmes. Foundational approaches, on the other hand, aim
to answer the questions concerning the reasons behind the use or application of a given
formalism. This might involve the search for a set of first principles which indepen-
dently motivate the use of certain theoretical tools or explanations (i.e. questions at the
research tradition level). Hinzen (2000) offers a comparative analysis of theminimalist
program and the principles and parameters framework along these lines. He states,
among other things, that minimalism attempts to rationalise rather than describe the
phenomena under study. Furthermore, it aims to discover general principles under-
lying explanations and avoid overly technical solutions. GB can be compared to MP
similarly. Whereas the GB framework approached the constitution of the common
linguistic substrate or Universal Grammar by asking ‘how much’ structure needs to
be innate, MP asks the question of ‘how little’ structure is needed. The operation of
merge (as well as select and move), which takes two items and creates a labelled set
containing both of these, is supposed to be the minimal requirement on the productive
capabilities of the language faculty. Our complex model of natural language syntax
now only involves a single operation which serves as the minimal causal basis for the
entire system isolated from other potential causal factors (such as functional roles, the
conceptual system etc.). There are some interesting ramifications of the merge postu-
late, both evolutionary and ontological. We will briefly return to some of the latter in
Sect. 8.
In this section, I have claimed that the generative tradition in linguistics, from ST to
MP, encompasses minimalist idealisation in the form of both minimal determination
and isolation in the models of the various theories. I followed a Cartwrightian line
in claiming that these techniques are indeed idealisations in terms of falsehoods not
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only because the rules of linguistic theory pertain to highly idealised models but also
because these models are taken to stand as placeholders for the true descriptions of
a future neuroscience. I now move on to extending this analysis beyond generative
grammar (narrowly construed) to other frameworks and the dynamic turn in syntax.
5 The dynamic turn and other frameworks
5.1 Other generative frameworks
Within the more broadly construed generative tradition in linguistics, we find many
examples of both isolation andminimal determination, as I have described them above.
Perhaps Jackendoff’s parallel architecture (PA) serves as one of the best cases of both
isolation and minimal determination and is therefore a useful starting point.
One of the aims of Jackendoff (2002) is to better integrate linguistics within cog-
nitive science. In order to achieve this aim, he rejects a number of components of the
Chomskyan view of generative linguistics, for instance the syntactocentrism, or the
view that syntax is the central generative element of language. Jackendoff holds that
this was a mistake. In opposition to this view, he proffers a parallel architecture of the
language faculty.
The alternative to be pursued here is that language comprises a number of inde-
pendent combinatorial systems, which are aligned with each other by means of
a collection of interface systems. Syntax is among the combinatorial systems,
but far from the only one (Jackendoff 2002, p. 111).
He goes on to describe each independent rule-bound and hierarchical system in
isolation from one another. This analysis includes a reconceptualisation of semantics
as “a combinatorial system independent of, and far richer than, syntactic structure”
(Jackendoff 2002, p. 123). Given this high level of modularity, we can glean a per-
fect case of isolation idealisation at work. Each system, phonological, syntactic and
semantic, is generated by independent structures. Due to this modelling strategy, the
interfaces between these structures become of particular importance in terms of a
holistic concept of natural language. For an idea of how this works, consider the
concept of the well-formedness of a sentence. Within the frameworks of the previ-
ous sections, the syntax determined the well-formedness of a sentence and the other
steps in the derivation (phonological and semantic) were somewhat epiphenomenal
(recall Chomsky’s famous Colourless green ideas example which was meant to show
grammaticality outwith interpretability). In the parallel architecture, the situation is
different. A sentence is only well-formed if it is so within each separate system and
there is a well-formed interface between them.12 Burten-Roberts and Poole (2006)
take issue with this aspect of the PA. They argue that trying to capture the structures
12 Some of these interface principles or rules are constraint based, such as the head constraint (borrowed
from HPSG) for the syntax-semantics interface or the required linear order mapping between phonology
and syntax. There are also static idioms which bypass syntax entirely and occur between the phonological
and semantic components.
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of the modules independently results in a loss of the initial rationale behind those
structures.
The term ‘semantic’ […] is relational. It suggests that themodule is distinct from
the central conceptual system in being dedicated to specifying the semantics-
of something expressions generated by the syntax, presumably. But this implies
that those expressions have semantic as well as syntactic properties […] Equally,
a mechanism that specifies the semantics-of syntactic expressions cannot be
encapsulated with respect to syntax. Its rationale lies in syntax, being effectively
‘interpretative’ of it (as in models the PA claims to repudiate) (Burten-Roberts
and Poole 2006, p. 622).
The complaint is essentially that the models of the PA neglect causally relevant
material, i.e. part of what determines the semantic module is syntactic in nature or
related to syntax. This, however, is consonant with my characterisation of isolation
idealisation (in terms of falsehood). In this type of idealisation, causally relevant
aspects are often ignored and false models are created for explanatory purposes. For
now, it suffices to appreciate the isolationistmodelling of the PA,whether it can retrieve
the connections with syntax (through interfaces) or not is not our chief concern here.
Nevertheless, despite the differences, the parallel architecture does maintain the
autonomy of syntax (and phonology and semantics) as well as the UG hypothesis
(although Jackendoff takes pains to divorce the concept from misinterpretations in
Sect. 4.2 of the book) and the competence-performance distinction (once again with
some criticism of how the idealisation has “hardened” over the years).
Optimality theory (OT) is another approach in which minimalist idealisation is har-
nessed.Minimal determination is both an implicit and explicit device inOT. Explicitly,
the formalism contains a generator which generates an infinite number of outputs or
candidates for representation for each input of the grammar. The evaluator compo-
nent then chooses the optimal output from the set of outputs through a set of ranked,
violable constraints or con (in the sense that violations are permitted but those of
higher level constraints count more than violations of lower level ones against the
potential optimal candidates). con is considered to be universal (in line with tenet 2).
In terms of generative grammar, it possesses an assumption “that there is a language
particular ranking of constraints from a universal set of constraints” (Blutner 2000,
p. 190).
One reason for questioning the place of OT within generative linguistic modelling,
as I have been describing it, is that it seems to be constraint-based as opposed to
derivational or “generative” (in the proof-theoretic sense). It should be noted that
GB also has a distinctive constraint-based flavour (more on model-theoretic syntax in
Sect. 7). However, importantly as Smolensky (2001) notes, “OThas been formulated in
both derivational and non-derivational or ‘parallel’ forms. Both variants are coherent
expressions of the theory”. The core idea in both cases can be explained in terms of
minimal determination idealisation. The property of being an “optimal candidate” is
generated directly by a universal set of inputs narrowed down by a minimal set of
constraints. Blutner (2000) himself offers a bidirectional OT approach to semantics
which is somewhat different to the generally unidirectional analysis of the generative
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programme. Nevertheless, the key idea here is the minimal set of constraints. In OT
phonology (where the framework received dominant status), the best analyses are the
ones which generate a given typology of phonetic combinations via a minimal set of
constraints and their relative rankings (see Hammond 1997; McCarthy 2003). In OT,
there is no room for extraneous constraints. In fact, the methodology is essentially
concerned with defining the fewest and often most specific constraints necessary for
generating optimal candidacy.
I think that this should be sufficient to display the pervasive nature of minimalist
idealisation through both minimal determination and isolation within the broader gen-
erative tradition. It might be objected at this point that there is major theory continuity
within the frameworks so far discussed and perhaps the modelling practices can be
more easily explicable in these terms. I do not think that this is necessarily the case.
Cartwright et al. (1995) argue that theory and modelling are independent processes in
the sciences. They argue that theories can serve as tools for models but are not to be
defined by them. Unfortunately discussing this version of instrumentalism will take
us too far afield, although in a similar vein to Cartwright et al., I will attempt to show,
by example, that modelling practices can be held constant despite significant theory
change. However, my method is the reverse of the one they take. While they argue
that the London model of superconductivity underwent model change without theory
change, I will argue that dynamic syntax utilises similar modelling strategies to the
generative tradition while the theory has been shifted on almost all accounts.
6 Modelling dynamics
In this section, I hope to extend my analysis of the modelling strategies employed
within the generative programme to a rival approach, namely dynamic syntax (DS). In
so doing, I also hope to provide an account of the theoretical differences between these
frameworks and their genesis in terms of the choices of minimal structures within the
models as opposed to a shift in modelling strategies in toto. As previously noted, I will
not be disputing the claim that DS marks a significant departure from the theory pre-
sented in generative grammar. For instance, the traditional competence-performance
divide, representationalism and the autonomy of syntax are all unabashedly abandoned
in this framework.13
In an attempt to account for both the deep context-dependence of natural languages
and compositionality, DS roots its idealisations in the “dynamics of real-time language
activities” (Cann et al. 2012, p. 359)where semantic factors inevitably affect any analy-
sis. Tree structures do not represent hierarchical formal features or even word order
in this framework but propositional content where nodes are not abstract syntactic
13 DS does, however, possess a sui generis competence-performance distinction.
As a result of this shift in perspective, the competence-performance distinction looks very differ-
ent. Though there remains a distinction between the linguistic-competence model and a general
theory of performance, the articulation of that competence model is no longer disconnected from
the articulation of the latter. To the contrary, the competence model is developed on the assump-
tion that it provides the architecture within which the choice mechanisms of performance have
to be implemented (Cann et al. 2005, p. 25).
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categories but compositional semantic concepts. Thus, there is no autonomous syn-
tactic component and the idealisations of formal language theory (which were heavily
reliant on the alleged connection between formal and natural languages) are jettisoned
in favour of a model of incremental semantic growth in terms of underspecification
and updates (in lieu of movement).
This theory does not characterise the surface (constituent) structure of a sen-
tence, but instead models the process of assigning an interpretation to a string of
words in a left to right fashion. In other words, taking information from words,
pragmatic processes and general rules, the theory derives partial tree structures
that represent the underspecified content of the string up to that point in the parse
(Cann 2001, p. 4).
For the point of illustration, let us return to the idea of well-formedness. We saw
with generative syntax and the parallel architecture, therewere two different but related
notions of the well-formedness of a linguistic expression or sentence. In DS, the
departure is more stark. Syntactic well-formedness is no longer the determining factor
within the linguistic concept. For instance, inmulti-person dialogues, certain sentences
(or strings) can be plainly ungrammatical in isolation and yet give rise to well-formed
structures.14 Consider the example from Cann et al. (2012, p. 365) below:
Father: We’re going to Granny’s.
Mother: to help her clean out her cupboards.
Child: Can I stay at home?
Mother: By yourself? You wouldn’t like that.
Various traditional locality requirements onpronouns or anaphors (such as yourself )
are violated in this exchange and yet it is unproblematically interpretable and natural.
Thus, the models of DS are built up from a basis that goes beyond the single-person
and sentence level boundaries of the previous frameworks whichwe have discussed. In
addition, the formalism acknowledges the word-by-word contribution within expres-
sions and not only the final output of a derivational process (in this way following the
path of unification-based grammar formalisms such as GPSG and HPSG etc.). “The
way this is achieved is to begin from a goal associated with some very partial structure
and progressively enrich that structure through the parse of a string of words” (Cann
et al. 2005, p. 33). Various techniques from semantics and dynamic semantics, such as
underspecification and updates, are incorporated in order to accomplish this analysis.
The usage-based (parsing) elements of this formalism take it further from the
abstract rule-based representationalism of the generative programme toward a charac-
terisation of linguistic knowledge as a type of “know-how”, i.e. knowing a language
involves knowing how to use it. Thus, it seems as though the models of DS are vastly
different from those of the generative programme and indeed, in some respects, they
are. However, in terms of the type of modelling employed by practitioners within this
14 Although the notion of ‘string well-formedness’ is not part of this approach (i.e. there is no ‘membership
problem’ in the Turing sense), the idea of a well-formed or ‘complete’ utterance is present (on the basis
of which grammatical judgements are made). “We may take the concept of ‘complete utterance’ in some
language L to be one for which it is possible to construct a propositional tree of type t from an uttered string
of words using the lexical, computational and pragmatic actions licensed in L (Cann et al. 2005, p. 398).
123
R. M. Nefdt
framework, I think some important continuity can be found. Primarily, I hope to show
that DS does employ a minimalist idealisation approach to its models.
In order to see themodelling continuity, let us revisit themotivations behind some of
the aspects of the theory change in DS. One of the leading motivations behind DS (and
the dynamic turn in linguistics in general) is the apparent failure of static accounts to
deal with phenomena such as ellipsis, anaphora and tense. In other words, the objec-
tion is that by focusing the minimal models on a static sentence and single person
boundary, the generative programme (and other approaches) has failed to capture the
property of interest in these cases, i.e. acceptibility judgements of speakers in many of
the cases involving dialogue data etc. Furthermore, ignoring such data as performance
error or dysfluency is claimed to result in incomplete models as well as only a partial
approach to the language acquisition problem (or the ‘explanatory adequacy’ of the
generative programme) since young children are confronted with such data on a daily
basis and it is systematic. “The effect [of ignoring the aforementioned data] will be
that no single linguistic phenomenon will receive a complete characterisation” (Cann
et al. 2012, p. 367).
Thus, the problem is notwith the technique ofminimalist idealisation but ratherwith
the starting point. In order to account for the complete desired property or phenomenon,
for instance anaphora in English, we need to consider a different minimal model, such
as the discourse level or dialogue data. The modelling strategy remains constant in this
case, e.g. minimal derivations in trees and operations on trees. DS modelling merely
starts its idealisations from a different place but still aims to determine the property
of interest (grammaticality or anaphoric binding) in a minimal way.
In making such a move into explaining what have been deemed to be structural
properties of language in terms of the ongoing process of building up interpre-
tation, there will have been a substantial shift in our assumptions about the basis
of syntactic explanations (Cann et al. 2005, p. 19).
The resulting model retains many structural features such as tree structure and
operations thereon (such as substitution and adjunction) as well as theoretical features
such as simplicity as per minimalist idealisation.
In contrast to standard and static approaches, we shall see that the time-linear
perspective of Dynamic Syntax allows an entirely natural set of analyses of these
phenomena using the same concepts of tree growth, while preserving incremen-
tality of parsing. In addressing these and other current puzzles, our claim in each
case will be that the model we set out will be uniformly simpler than other more
conventional models that are designed not to reflect the time-linearity of natural
language processing (Cann et al. 2005, p. 25).
I think that isolationmight be somewhat harder to establish as most DS models are
quite integrative.Nevertheless, there are aspects of the theorywhichdisplay isolationist
modelling tendencies. For instance, the semantic typing system (a modified version of
Montague grammar) is defined separately from the modal logic definitions involved
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with the tree formalism which is a variant of the Logic of Finite Trees (Blackburn and
Meyer-Viol 1994).15
In DS, linguists are still in the business of developing minimal models and attempt-
ing to “generate” (in the sense ofminimal determination) the properties or explanations
thereof by offering a causal basis which ignores even potentially relevant or related
material. The framework might seem to aim for “completeness” but this completeness
should not be confusedwith completeness at the initialmodelling stage. In otherwords,
the models aim to account for phenomena such as anaphora, ellipsis, quantifier scope
etc. in a more complete way than their predecessors (of the generative persuasion) but
they aim to do so through the most economical means possible (replete with the gamut
of ceteris paribus modifiers and the like). For instance, underspecification plays an
important role in the theory. This is a technique used to represent or generate multiple
semantic (or other) representations within a single representation. Underspecification
is a common technique for dealing with a wide range of ambiguities (both lexical
and structural) in natural language semantics (and processing), without necessarily
altering anything at the syntactic level.16
Semantic underspecification is basically an intentional omission of linguistic infor-
mation from semantic description. The underlying idea is to postpone semantic
analysis until it can be executed in such away that various ambiguities can be resolved.
This is accomplished by producing a single representation capable of representing
multiple realisations. In other words,
The key idea of underspecification is to devise a formalism which allows to
represent all logical readings of a sentence in a single compact structure. Such a
formalism allows one to preserve compositionality without artfully casting pure
semantic ambiguities into syntactic ones. (Lesmo and Robaldo 2006, p. 550).
This process amounts to a typeof storageof interpretationswithout immediately check-
ing for consistency. At a later stage these interpretations are pulled out or extracted
and interpreted in parallel. A given semantic representation can be underspecified in
one of two ways.
1. Atomic subexpressions (constants and variables) may be ambiguous, i.e. do not
have a single value specified as their denotation, but a range of possible values;
2. The way in which subexpressions are combined by means of constructions may
not be fully specified (Bunt 2007, p. 60).
These paths specify constraints on representations of meaning and are often viewed
as meta-representations which display all the representations that satisfy the set of
constraints, i.e. all the possible readings of an expression.
Consider the following classical example of semantic underspecification in terms of
scope ambiguity. It is well-known that sentences such as Every linguist likes some tree
have at least two readings, one in which each linguist in the relevant domain is fond
15 I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the potential modularity of the DS framework at the
metalinguistic level.
16 For instance, representing the scope ambiguities through alternative syntactic derivations can lead to
an explosion of ambiguity and the need for innumerable alternative syntactic configurations. See Bunt and
Muskens (1999) for a proof of this based on the ambiguity in an average Dutch sentence.
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of one specific tree (existential) and another in which there are many trees which are
liked by many linguists (universal). One could account for these alternative readings
by means of compositional semantic rules defined over distinct syntactic derivations.
This is the Montagovian route. Or one could represent both (or all) readings in one
structure via underspecification. We will follow Bos (1996) and Blackburn and Bos
(1999) in defining a simpleHole Semantic framework (I have simplified the framework
considerably, for the sake of illustration).
For this task we need two new tools, labels and holes respectively. Labels
1, 2, . . . , n are associated with each element of the set of expressions EU . If a
label 1 consists of two subexpressions which are joined by a construction k, then
1: k(2, h1) where 2 is the first of subexpressions and the second is an unknown
entity called a hole “i.e. a variable that ranges over the labels of the subexpressions in
EU ” (Bunt 2007, p. 64).
Thehole variables are plugged (or glued or resolved) bymeans of operationswhich
replace the holes with subexpressions. The procedure is as follows. Labels are our
constants and holes are the variables over these constants conceived as arguments over
certain operators which possess scope. Constraints are defined in order to reorganise
the elements in such a way that they cover every possible reading of a given sentence.
Then, we have our pluggings (which are one-to-onemappings from holes to labels).
“A plugging is a bijective assignment function, with the sets of holes as scope and the
set of labels as range” (Bos 1996, p. 135). The pluggings can be represented by an
object language such as intensional logic or tree structures with lambda expressions
as in DS or whatever. Consider the sample sentence again:
Every linguist likes some tree.
The underspecified representation will look something like the tuple below:〈⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
2
3
h0
h1
h2
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
,
⎧⎨
⎩
1 : ∀x(Linguist (x) → h1)
2 : ∃y(tree(y) ∧ h2
3 : L I K E(x, y)
⎫⎬
⎭ ,
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1 ≤ h0
2 ≤ h0
3 ≤ h1
3 ≤ h2
⎫⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
〉
There are three components to the above representation. On the left, we have the
inventory of labels and holes or set thereof. In themiddle, we have what Blackburn and
Bos (1999) call “PLU-formulas” (or Predicate Logic Unplugged formulas defined in
the usual way in terms of the syntax of PL). On the right, we have our set of constraints
on scoping relations.
In order to retrieve the readings, we introduce variables h0 for “widest scope” and
h1 for “narrow scope”. Firstly, in defining the constraints, we would want linguist ′
to be under the scope ‘every’, i.e. 1 ≤ h0, and tree′ to be under the scope of ‘some’,
i.e. 2 ≤ h1. Then, obviously we would also want 3 ≤ h2 and 3 ≤ h1 or “the
basic PLU-formula [L I K E(x, y)] is forced to be outscoped by the consequent of
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the universal quantifier’s scope, and the second conjunct of the existential quantifier’s
scope” (Blackburn and Bos 1999, p. 86). Hence, there are two pluggings available:
P1 : {1 ≤ h0, 2 ≤ h1, 3 ≤ h2}
P2 : {2 ≤ h0, 3 ≤ h1, 1 ≤ h2}
The two pluggings correspond to the two possible readings for the quantified sen-
tence, the first is the reading in which the universal has wide scope, i.e. in which
multiple trees are liked, and the second is the reading in which the existential has
wide scope, i.e. there is one distinct tree liked by all. Scope itself is the underspec-
ified content in this representation. In DS, one kind of underspecified content takes
place at locations in trees which through the operation of adjunction (borrowed from
Tree-Adjoining Grammar) can be fixed to unfixed nodes. So the tree structures have
underspecified branches (usually represented by dashed lines) and can be fixed to
different nodes for the purposes of either anaphora resolution or other tasks.17
The overarching point is that semantic underspecification is a means of captur-
ing multiple meanings within a single structure and a clear example of a minimalist
idealisation. Underspecification is essentially misrepresentation for the sake of dis-
ambiguation or resolution at a later stage in the process. The rules of the grammar
then apply to this idealised compact structure. Many of the other techniques utilised
in DS are similarly motivated and closely aligned to simplicity considerations. The
framework (non-trivially) exploits the strategy of minimal determination, as I have
described in the previous chapter. In this way, it is within the modelling paradigm of
the broader generative tradition in linguistics despite theoretical differences.
7 Model-theoretic syntax and overgeneralisation
Before concluding, I think it expedient to address a potential objection. One poten-
tial concern when offering accounts of modelling in linguistics (and the sciences in
general) is the overgeneralisation of explanation. In describing a phenomenon which
admits to certain vague or imprecise notions such as ‘causality’, ‘minimal’, ‘determi-
nation’ etc., a theorist can often provide explanations which trivially capture too much
(or everything) and thus fail to distinguish between relevant alternatives. If all of lin-
guistics from Hockett’s finite grammar to Smolensky’s harmonic grammar or Croft’s
radical construction grammar could be explained in terms of minimalist idealisation, it
would be no surprise that dynamic syntax followed suit. Fortunately, I believe that this
is far from the case. In what follows, I will brieflymention some linguistic frameworks
(or families of frameworks) which I believe do not haveminimalist idealisation at their
core. Once again, it is in no way my claim that minimalist idealisation is a preferable
modelling strategy. I take no position on the fecundity of one type of modelling over
another, my project is merely a descriptive one. I should also note that this analysis
is not meant to be exhaustive. Many frameworks, including generative grammar, can
17 DS also makes use of “formula underspecification” more redolent of traditional accounts such as Cooper
Storage in which formulas are replaced with underspecified content (or semantic representations acting as
placeholders for lambda terms). Even the X-bar schemata of Sect. 4.1 can be considered underspecification
albeit of a different nature to the semantic underspecification discussed above.
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and do involve other forms of modelling and idealisation. My claim is that minimalist
idealisation is at the centre of many of these frameworks, not that it is the only strategy
used to model linguistic reality within them (or to theorise more generally).
As I have mentioned, there are some similarities between both the parallel archi-
tecture and DS to model-theoretic approaches to grammar, I think that this would be
a good point at which to describe these non-minimalist idealisation approaches. In
Pullum and Scholz (2001) and Pullum (2013), the notions of generative-enumerative
versus model-theoretic syntactic formalisms are discussed and teased apart. The for-
mer are related to the formalisms discussed in the previous sections (with the exception
of DS which has elements of both). These formalisms drew inspiration from the syn-
tactic (or proof-theoretic) side of mathematical logic (and Post’s work on the subject).
However, model-theoretic approaches were developed from the semantic side of logic
and diverge from the generative-enumerative approach significantly. In this way, I
think that model-theoretic syntax idealises its models in a distinct way as well, i.e. not
via minimalist idealistion.
One of the core technical notions of the previous formalisms was that of “genera-
tion” in the ‘recursively enumerate’ sense of defining a device with a finite set of rules
capable of generating an infinite set of sentences/strings/structures. On the contrary
“[a]n MTS [model-theoretic syntax] grammar does not recursively define a set of
expressions; it merely states necessary conditions on the syntactic structures of indi-
vidual expressions” (Pullum and Scholz 2001, p. 19). Think of this approach in terms
of model-theory. A sentence is well-formed iff it is a model of the grammar (defined
in terms of constraints which act as the axioms of the formalism). To be a model of the
grammar is to be an expression which satisfies the grammar (meets the constraints).
Consider the first-order analogy. To be a model of arithmetic is to satisfy (or make
true) the axioms of arithmetic (Peano or others). There are nonstandard models of
course and Gödel’s famous incompleteness result showed that there can never be a
complete axiomatisation of arithmetic (i.e. no system will be able to capture all the
truths of arithmetic). The point is that the idea of “being a model” of a grammar in
this sense is quite divorced from the idea of “being generated” by a given grammar.
Formalisms such as generalised phrase structure grammar (GPSG) and head-driven
phrase structure grammar (HPSG) are examples of this constraint-based approach.18
Some differences between the approaches involve concepts such as set cardinality. In
Sect. 4. we saw the motivation behind early generative grammar was to capture the
notion of linguistic creativity described in terms of discretely infinite output. This is a
corollary of the generative-enumerative approach, i.e. generative grammars generate or
produce a fixed number or set of expressions (the upperbound isℵ0 or the cardinality of
the natural numbers). Contrary to this, model-theoretic or constraint-based grammars
do not impose such size-limits and are generally non-committal in terms of cardinality
(which is not to say that they cannot account for creativity). The core of idea of
18 Although in the introduction of their textbook, Sag et al. (2003) speak in generative terms about the
purpose and nature of grammar. “Thus we will again and again be engaged in the exercise of formulating a
grammar that generates a certain set of word strings—the sentences predicted to be grammatical according
to that grammar” (2003, p. 21). They also stress the importance of capturing the infinite set of expressions
of natural language (through Kleene star operations and the like).
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specifying the least amount of rules for the most amount of structural description is
thus jettisoned in favour of listing as many constraints as the multifarious features of
language seems to dictate.
Now, there is certainly a parallel between specifying a set of axioms or constraints
in defining a grammar and specifying a set of rules in generating one but the latter
approach is more in line with minimalist idealisation than the former for important
reasons. There are other significant differences, but I shall focus on those that involve
(or result in) a shift in modelling practices. We have already seen that the concept of
infinity generation is abandoned on the model-theoretic approach but another impor-
tant (relevant) departure fromminimalist idealistion is the level atwhich themodels are
defined. For frameworks within this paradigm, models are individual expressions, not
sets of such expressions. In the generative programme, for the sake of generality, there
was a movement towards categories (as sets) of expressions and rules involving these
categories (recall the X-bar rule schemata in Sect. 4.1). Model-theoretic accounts, on
the other hand, quantify over specific expressions and the structures relating to these
expressions.
For example, if trees are the intended models, quantifiers in the statements of
MTS grammar range over a set of nodes, not over a set of trees (Pullum and
Scholz 2001, p. 23).
There are some important consequences of this feature of model-theoretic
approaches. They all seem to be related to the greater specificity or accuracy which
they allow the grammar to express or capture. For instance, expression fragments can
more readily be treated under this framework. These could be fragments with syntactic
structure or information (and semantic or phonological as well) that are not strictly
grammatical [such as and of the example in Pullum and Scholz (2001)] and thus would
not be generated by a generative grammar. By focusing on individual expressions we
can also capture the use and proliferation of neologisms and the lexically creative
aspect of natural languages. Given that the lexica of various languages are constantly
changing, a formalism (or family of formalisms) which can capture (or at least not
make bad predictions) about such expressions would be useful.19
There are a number of other such differences related tomodels as individual expres-
sions. Some linguists (within the probabilistic school) have been claimed that the
generative-enumerative approach can be described as “prescriptive” in the pejorative
“grammar school” sense fromwhich linguists have taken pains to separate themselves.
There are constructions and phrases that pop up all over human language (and cor-
pora) that would be deemed simply ungrammatical in the generative sense (i.e. not
generated by any rule).20 Manning (2003) identifies one such construction, namely
19 Both language fragments and neologisms can be captured by the incremental word-by-word parsing
formalism of DS in a generative-enumerative way. In addition, some interpretations of Minimalism might
also have the resources to deal with these phenomena.
20 This is related to the motivation behind DS and its claim that generative grammars offer incomplete
descriptions since theymiss out on relevant and systematic data found in corpora andmulti-person discourse.
However, traditional GB/Minimalist accounts in terms of ‘ellipsis’ might work as well for many of these
cases.
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as least as. This construction sounds strange at first glance but does seem to appear
across various texts. Manning (2003) claims that generative grammar (which he calls
a “categorical linguistic theory”) is prescriptive in the sense that it places hard bound-
aries on grammaticality when these boundaries are much fuzzier in reality. I think
that the point misinterprets the modelling strategies, such as minimalist idealisation,
at the heart of the generative models discussed above. Unfortunately, the probabilistic
linguistic models Manning suggests in their stead are beyond the current scope of dis-
cussion. Importantly, however, the criticism is related to the model-theoretic approach
and its method of idealisation. In one way, generative grammars idealise too little (as
per minimalist idealisation) and, on the other, they overgenerate (due to the lack of
specificity). Thus, there is a need for theta-grids and other ways of narrowing down
the grammatical output of the grammar in generative frameworks such as Government
and Binding.
Constraint-based grammars focus on individual expressions and their satisfaction
of certain sets of constraints. In so doing, they not only move away from the idea
of minimal transformational derivation, but also admit for increased specificity at the
individual expression level and in turn at the initial model level. The model aims to
admit and satisfy as many constraints as needed to encode syntactic, semantic and
other information, in order to characterise grammatical well-formedness. However,
the descriptions involved in the models of the grammars can be quite complex. In fact,
the models or expressions can be infinite in length on the constraint-based view (a
welcomed feature for adherents of Langendoen and Postal’s (1984) “vastness” result).
Whereas in generative grammar this is not the case (without significant modification
of the notion of “generative” or “derivation”). This is another advantage of the MTS
framework according to Pullum and Scholz (2001).
So our base case could begin with a potentially infinite model (expression) with a
multitude of constraints (all well-motivated of course). With the development of the
generative programme in Sects. 4 and 4.2 we saw a progression toward generality and
the exclusion of (even causally relevant) material, in the model-theoretic framework
of constraint-based approaches we see the reverse and a progression toward specificity
and the inclusion of more information, some of which is causally relevant material,
others not necessarily so (e.g. there might be irrelevant phonological information for
instance). In addition, these approaches tend not to bemodular ormake use of isolation
idealisation. For instance, feature structures, which can be modelled as functions from
sets of features to values (or valences), in HPSG, are used to model grammatical
categories as information structures. These structures can be extremely complex (as
anyone who has used or seen a tree in HPSG can attest). The inclusion of semantics
introduces additional information and structure into the features structures.
The richer feature structures we are now using, together with our highly schema-
tized rules, have required us to refine our notion of how a grammar is related
to the fully determinate phrase structure trees of the language (Sag et al. 2003,
p. 167).
To close off this sketch, let us consider a basic operation in the grammar, namely
unification. This operation takes two feature structures and creates one that contains
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all the information (and constraints) of both (as long as it is not inconsistent). Thus
we are building larger and larger information structures into the scientific models of
the grammar. I think we have moved quite a distance from minimalist idealisation
and the modelling practices that come with it. One aspect of minimalist ideali-
sation is that de-idealisation is very often not possible, recall the Ising model of
ferromagnetism mentioned in Sect. 4 in which particles are represented simply as
points along a line. Feature structures and model-theoretic syntax allow for grad-
ability of representation and the re-introduction of removed material. To be more
specific, in formal language theory, sentences are modelled as semantically vacuous
strings. A grammar, as a generative device, specifies the types of rules applica-
ble to these strings in order to generate different sets of strings, i.e. languages, of
varying complexity. For example adding recursive rules to the rules which gener-
ate regular grammars gives rise to context-free grammars and so on (this picture is
overly simplistic for the sake of illustration). Given this idealisation, there is simply
no room for semantic content or phonological character to enter into the resulting
model. These aspects of language are dealt with separately (in line with isolation
idealisation). Contrasted with this, in constraint-based or model-theoretic approaches
we can admit as much information into the base syntactic feature structures as we
like, including semantic and phonological features. The models are not incompatible
with introducing more and more information or features in order to “come closer”
to the real world target system. This is the hallmark of Galilean idealisation (or
mere abstraction) as (Weisberg 2007, 2013) describes it or distortion for the sake
of computational tractability with the possibility of reintroduction of abstracted or
idealised material. However, this is generally not a feature of minimalist idealisa-
tion.
8 Why models?
As previously mentioned, an assumption prevalent in this research is that grammar
construction in linguistics is a type of modelling or indirect representation. There are
various benefits of adopting this perspective, I will focus on two such reasons here,
one from the philosophy of linguistics and the other related to issues in the philosophy
of science more generally.
8.1 Infinity, recursion and modelling
The first issue concerns the alleged “incoherence” of the generative programme in
linguistics. It has been claimed, by Katz, Postal and others, that on the one hand
generative linguistics has an unifying scientific agenda in that linguistics is supposed
to be the study of the language faculty conceived of inmentalist and thereby physicalist
terms (or at least post-Aspects generative grammar).Grammars describe I-languages or
cognitive states of the language capacity corresponding to the various rules of specific
languages. On the other hand, linguistics maintains that strictly formal aspects such as
discrete infinity and the set-theoretic operation ofmerge are essential to the description
of natural language. The latter aspects are held so strongly that discrete infinity is often
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claimed to be the single most significant component of the language faculty narrowly
construed (i.e. an explanandum as opposed to an idealisation) (see Chomsky et al.
2002).
The received view claims that an NL is something psychological/biological […]
a state of an organ […] And yet it has been unvaryingly claimed in the same
tradition at issue that NL is somehow infinite. These two views are not consistent
(Postal 2003, p. 242).
If we accept that linguistic grammars, which contain “infinity yielding” operations
such as merge, are indirectly related to the target system of natural language, then
the worry evaporates. Models do not commit the physical world to their properties
any more than a physical model of DNA commits the molecular structure of living
organisms to Styrofoam or plastic constitution. In other words, the usefulness of a
model does not require that every property of the model be a property of the system
being modelled. Models need only resemble the target system and as we have seen
this process does not always involve veridical representation, i.e. is not directly onto-
logically committing to the target system. For instance, Tiede and Stout (2010) offer
a similar analysis of generative grammars.
It is clear that to the extent that linguistic theories, i.e. grammars, aim to cap-
ture human knowledge of language, these theories are formal models. In fact,
grammars in the generative tradition are symbolic models, as opposed to, say,
connectionist models or dynamical systems (Clark 2001). The fact that gener-
ative linguistics employs symbolic models has a crucial impact on the role of
recursion and infinity (147).
They go on to claim that linguists are not committed to natural languages being
discretely infinite just because recursion is a feature of our generative grammars. Thus,
discrete or denumerable infinity is assumed or a “modelling choice” on their view and
not a feature of the target system as both generativists and platonists, such as Postal,
claim. Furthermore, as shown in Pullum and Scholz (2010), recursive rules do not
guarantee infinite structures or structural descriptions, “[a] generative grammar can
make recursive use of non-useless symbols and yet not generate an infinite stringset”
(120).21 Nor for thatmatter does linguistic infinity require recursion, as Tomalin (2007,
pp. 1797–1798) notes “if the sole requirement is to generate an infinite number of
structures using finite means, then an iterative, rather than a ‘recursive’, process could
accomplish this, and while such a procedure may be less efficient than a ‘recursive’
procedure, the basic point is that a requirement for infinite structures using finitemeans
is not itself sufficient to motivate the use of specifically recursive procedures.”
21 The recursive rule they use to show this is V P → V P V P in a simple context-free grammar for the
sentence They came running which generates only two structures They came and They came running.
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Even if we do not accept Postal’s challenge (as many linguists are wont to do),22
we still need to account for the nature of operations such as merge or other recursive
constructions within natural language and whether or not they should receive physical
instantiation. Accepting that grammars are models (in the scientific sense) enables
theorists to avoid debates as to the universal nature of these operations and the plethora
of claims to the contrary.
8.2 Structural realism and linguistics
The next reason for the present modelling perspective stems from the philosophy of
sciencemore generally.When caught between the pull of realism and the rational scep-
ticism of anti-realism, structural realism has often been considered a happy medium
(the “best of both worlds” strategy). I want to sketch some of the reasons for opting
for this alternative (coupled with a modelling interpretation) within the context of
linguistic theory.
It is well-known that traditional realism in the philosophy of science faces a serious
challenge often referred to as pessimistic meta-induction or the problem of radical
theory change. This problem relates to explaining progress in science. If our theories
are true of the world (or even approximately so), then how can we explain scien-
tific progress in cases in which theories have radically altered (as in the move from
Newtonian to Relativistic physics)?
One answer to these sorts of worries is scientific anti-realism. On views under this
framework, scientific theories need only be empirically adequate (get the observables
right). Van Fraasen (1980) is one case of this view. Interestingly, this latter work has led
to much of the focus on modelling in contemporary philosophy of science. Although
this might be a viable option, it does lead to similar worries to that of instrumentalism
in rendering the success of our models or grammars inexplicable (or miraculous).
There is, however, a more modest alternative in views under the banner of structural
realism. As Ladyman (1998) puts it,
Rather we should adopt the structural realist emphasis on the mathematical
or structural content of our theories. Since there is (says Worrall) retention
of structure across theory change, structural realism both (a) avoids the force
of the pessimistic meta-induction (by not committing us to belief in the the-
ory’s description of the furniture of the world), and (b) does not make the
success of science […] seem miraculous (by committing us to the claim that
22 Postal (2009) briefly addresses and dismisses a related line of argumentation. He claims that understand-
ing “infinite generation” or “recursion” as idealisations of some sort is to illegitimately equivocate on the
terms ‘idealisation’ and ‘recursive’. As opposed to the idealisation of say a frictionless plane in physics,
this idealisation is more close to “one which claims the solar system has an infinity of planets” (2009,
p. 110). However, I would argue that if such an idealisation were useful to a physicist or astronomer or
helped understand some other property of the solar system, then it would be a perfectly acceptable aspect of
a model (statistical cosmology is full of such idealisation). See Morrison (2015) for a number of examples
involving the simplifying assumption of infinity in particle physics and population genetics. See Savitch
(1993) for an account of how viewing natural languages as “essentially infinite” (even if they are only
largely finite) might involve simplicity considerations similarly.
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the theory’s structure, over and above its empirical content, describes the world)
(410).
Contemporary linguistics faces a similar situation to that of the various paradigm
shifts in the history of science. The dominant tradition, or rather specific theories under
the programme of generative grammar, is under increased scrutiny and alternative
frameworks such as Dynamic Syntax, HPSG, and Construction Grammar abound.
Understood in structural realist terms, this does not entail abandoning many of the
insights or successes of the former. Linguistics, like the natural sciences, does not
begin de novo with every theory change, if we maintain the continuity of structure.
Seen in this light, the previous sections argued for structural relations or similarity
between not only different strains of the generative tradition but also across other
frameworks such as DS.23
The structures in question are the mathematical models of the theories or the gram-
mars.24 In Weisberg (2013), he describes a third kind of model besides the concrete
and mathematical ones, namely computational models. To a certain extent, it is not
clear how distinct computational models are from mathematical models (as Weisberg
seems to admit when pressed). Nevertheless, computational models have a distinctive
procedural or algorithmic element. This aspect allows them to track or represent the
dynamics of systems (in terms of states and transitions between them). The models
of generative grammar (and dynamic syntax) are of this variety according to most
of its practitioners. This might turn out to be no more than a convenient parlance,
further reducing the lines between mathematical models and computational ones in
linguistics. As Pullum (2013) notes
The fact that derivational steps come in a sequence has encouraged the practice
of talking about them in procedural terms. Although this is merely a metaphor,
it has come to have a firm grip on linguists thinking about syntax (Pullum 2013,
p. 496).25
The model in DS still involves tree structures and relations between nodes but it
extends this analysis beyond the features of the generative picture with a genuinely
23 There is precedent for the extension of the structural realist analysis beyond the natural sciences. See
Kincaid (2008) for such an account for the social sciences.
24 Taking themodels themselves to be the structures of a structural realist account is also not unprecedented.
On Morgan and Morrison’s (1999) account, models are (partially) independent of theory and the target
system as discussed above. Autonomy of models is also argued for in Suárez and Cartwright (2008) with
relation to the Londons’ model of superconductivity.
25 If we do take the metaphor seriously though, we might be tempted to describe another underlying
difference between derivational and non-derivational or model-theoretic grammars, in that the former and
not the latter can be considered to be computational (where computational is understood as a proper subset
of mathematical models). Chomsky (2000, pp. 98–100) seems to have something similar in mind when he
discusses the difference between the derivational approach and the representational approach, the former is
meant to be understood as a genuinely algorithmic construal of the brain’s actual design vis-á-vis generating
linguistic expressions and the latter is to be understood as a “direct recursive definition” or conditions on
expressionhood (as in the model-theoretic case). Despite claiming that the differences might be overstated
or merely intertranslatable, he goes on to adopt a derivational approach under the assumption that it does
hold unique insights into language (and additional questions concerning it). The present work can be seen
as an account of wherein this difference lies exactly, i.e. modelling strategies.
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procedural aspect. For instance, we have seen (in Sect. 6) that the model base in DS
also includes multi-person dialogues. Importantly, extending the standard generative
models in line with GB and other frameworks is also possible and would then cover
the same data i.e. be empirically equivalent (see below for an example). Thus, the
idealisations would be similar (operations and relations on trees), both would involve
procedural computational models and both would cover the same data (as opposed
to say the “flat structures” of dependency grammars). The idea, of course, cannot be
that the models are identical since they are not, but rather the claim is that generative
grammar and dynamic syntax make use of similar structures, here conceived of as
families of computational models. Cann et al. are illuminating this point.
[W]e take the concept of a TREE STRUCTURE familiar in syntax and use it
to represent, not structure defined over words in a string, but the interpretations
assigned to words uttered in context (Cann et al. 2005, p. 32).
The above situation is similar to the case of the Londons’ model of superconductiv-
ity. The previous model was considered to be limited in explanatory power and scope.
For instance, it could not account for the Meissner effect, which is the expulsion of
magnetic fields from superconductors during the transition to the superconducting
state. In order to account for this effect, the Londons took superconductors to be dia-
magnets as opposed to ferromagnets, a modelling choice independent of theory [or
so it is argued by Suárez and Cartwright (2008)]. In the same way that the Londons’
model is claimed to have borrowed piecemeal from other models and theories, DS too
borrows from other models, some generative and some model-theoretic, and theories,
some static and others dynamic, in order to account for anaphoric relations beyond
the sentence and person boundary. The model structure or scaffolding (via trees and
relations and constraints on subtrees) remains constant. By appreciating the concept
and use of models, we gain a clearer picture of theory change and theory comparison
which helps to forge a closer tie with the structural realist position in the philosophy
of science and thereby provides potential answers to the questions of progress and
change in linguistics.
This situation is, however, dissimilar from some of the usual conclusions drawn
from the recent flurry of formal proofs as to the weak equivalence of various grammar
formalisms (i.e. they generate or produce the same sets of expressions/sentences).
The idea is that minimalist syntax (MS),26 phrase-structure grammars (PSG), tree-
substitution grammars (TSG), head-driven phrase structure grammars (HPSG) and
dependency grammars (DG) are all really just “notational variants” of one another
with little empirical consequence [as in Chomsky’s (2000) example of 25 = 52 vs
5 = √25]. To a working linguist qua modeller, I argue, these proofs mean little
to nothing. For instance, dependency grammars posit structural relations which differ
significantly fromphrase-structure grammars (in fact,DG isflat structurally as opposed
to hierarchical, i.e. argument form trumps dominance relations). Similarly, TSG’s lack
a mechanism for deriving rules such as adverbial modification (easily specified in
PSGs) since they do not possess an adjunction operation as in later Tree-adjoining
26 Or rather Stabler’s (1997) interpretation thereof.
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grammars. Yet many of these formalisms can be shown to be weakly equivalent. As
Rambow and Joshi (1997) note, these equivalences are of little consequence to the
syntacticians working in a given syntactic framework who still go about their daily
business in very different ways. “The result is a dependency tree, CFGs and TSG are
weakly equivalent.However, to a linguist, they look very different” (Rambowand Joshi
1997, p. 3). Again, by appreciating the roles and operations of the models themselves,
we can arrive at a more nuanced account of theory similarity and dissimilarity in
linguistics, as I hope to have shown.
Thus we can be realists about the structures indirectly picked out by the models
and at the same time be instrumentalists about the models themselves. Also, in light
of what we have seen in this paper, theories cannot just be collections of models, since
we have seen that models operate in partial autonomy from theories. Models, however,
could still inform theory construction. Cases such as Dirac’s discovery of the positron,
in which an assumed artifact of the model was found to be ontologically significant
to the target system, show that it is possible that the structures indirectly represented
by models can eventually be described directly by theory.27
By way of example, consider briefly binding in both generative grammar and
dynamic syntax. I hope to show that the analysis along the lines of generative grammar
is similar to that of DS structurally.
Binding is a relation which holds between anaphors and antecedents (indexed
below) within what is called a binding domain.
3. Maryi mentioned that shei was excited about linguistics.
In this case,Mary is said to bind she. In the generative literature, the binding domain
or the linguistic environment which licenses binding is the sentence (or the TP in some
cases). This model of anaphora could have various initial limitations. For one thing,
as we have seen, it is focused on the sentence and single person boundaries. Another
aspect of the analysis is that given that binding is usually constituted by a dominance
relation on nodes in trees (c-command), order (in the tree) becomes important. A
favourite construction of dynamic syntacticians is a type of long-distance dependency
called “left-dislocated” expressions as in the examples below modified from Cann
et al. (2005, pp. 167/170).
4. Mary, John thinks Tom had upset.
5. Mary, she I think isn’t coming.28
If binding is governedby c-commandwhich holds only betweenmothers anddaugh-
ters in trees, then (4) and (5) are rendered infelicitous (they contravene Condition B
in traditional GB binding theory). Nevertheless, there are many modifications of the
27 Dirac initially thought negative energy solutions were merely features of the mathematical model and
not physically realised but later, after finding physical interpretations of them, he revised his theory which
led to the prediction of the existence of a novel particle, the positron. See Bueno and Colyvan (2011) for
further discussion.
28 If the examples seem unnatural in English, cross-linguistic evidence attests to the phenomenon more
broadly. For instance, in the German constructionDen Peter, den habe ich gesehen. (I saw Peter) (Ott 2014,
p. 269) and many other cases.
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standard theory which do aim to account for long-distance dependencies such as those
mentioned above. These accounts are usually couched in terms ofmovement and traces
(see Wiltschko 1997; Zaenen 1997). Frey (2004), following Cinque (1990), posits a
quasi-movement dependency called a chain. Assuming a biclausal structure (in order
to model the so-called external and internal aspects of this kind of construction), the
underlying structure is “[a] chain 〈α1, . . . , αn〉 is a sequence of nodes sharing the
same θ -role such that for any i , 1 ≤ i < n, αi c-commands and is coindexed with
αi+1” (Frey 2004, p. 223). Importantly, this kind of analysis aims to rescue the binding
relation in terms of c-command and movement but “crucially in the absence of actual
movement” (Ott 2014, p. 276).
Ott’s (2014) own proposal for characterising the phenomenon takes (contrastive)
left-dislocation to be a form of clausal ellipsis. Specifically, the dislocated element
(Mary in (4)) is left over from clausal ellipsis such that, via deletion of the sister
node containing I think ti isn’t coming, the surface form [CP1 [Mary]i [I think ti
isn’t coming][CP2 shek I think tk isn’t coming] is produced. The account proposed by
Ott is aimed at uniting left-dislocation with a more general phenomenon of elliptical
construction (such as sluicing and fragment answers).
Similarly, DS aims to unite (or at least distinguish in a principled manner) this
phenomenon with both right-peripheral dislocation and other constructions (such as
topicalisation and relative clauses). The DS analysis is different from standard or
generative accounts for sentences such as (4) and (5). It operates by means of under-
specification of a tree relation and adjunction (which allows for unfixed notes to play
a crucial role). So the structure in DS is one in which the dislocated element (again,
Mary) occupies an unfixed position in the tree such that only after all the words are
parsed the node is fixed and the formula value of the whole-sentence (T y(t) for truth-
value) can be resolved. Consider the DS tree for a simple case (I will ignore features
of the representation which do not concern my present point).
6. Mary, John dislikes. (Cann et al. 2003, p. 8)
Tn(a), ?T y(t)
〈↑∗〉 Tn(a),F◦(Mary) F◦(John)
F◦(dislikes) ?T y(e), 
Now, although type specifications and the like are used in the tree construction,
importantly so too are structural or dominance relations (↑ and↓ respectively). Specif-
ically, ‘↑∗’ encodes the inverse of the dominance relation or the reflexive transitive
closure of the mother relation. In order to account for cases like (4) and (5), we need
more machinery. Technically such cases require the LINK relation to be introduced.
Marten (2005) describes the LINK relation as “not related to the matrix tree by a
function-argument relation” (i.e. it is not a mother or a daughter node), it is part of the
tree and imposes a requirement on the main tree that there be a copy of its formula
value included” (534). In other words, LINK relates nodes in different trees structures.
Then, similarly to hanging topic constructions, the pronouns or anaphors would be
co-referential with the formulas of the main or host trees such that in cases such as
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(6) the “left-peripheral item annotates an unfixed node within a single structure” and
in (4) and (5) it “is taken to annotate a distinct structure within a pair of linked trees”
(Cann et al. 2003, p. 18). The conclusion that is drawn is then:
Notice how this modelling of natural language structure through dynamic con-
cepts of growth replaces the static configurational approach, so that concepts
such as c-command defined over a fixed structure are in general replaced by the
dynamic concept of order of processing and tree development (Cann et al. 2003,
p. 8).
However, it is not clear, structurally speaking, how different the various proposals
really are. In the movement proposals, we saw a notion of quasi-movement, or rep-
resentations that mimic actual movement, in accordance with chain. In Ott’s ellipsis
proposal, we saw movement, deletion and biclausal structure. In DS, we have tree
location underspecification which is similar to the quasi-movement of Frey (2004) and
the Adjunction and LINK operations which connect different structures at the nodes,
again similar to Ott’s posit of two CPs with traces connecting various elements. Now
of course, in terms of theory, Cann et al. (2003) are completely accurate in stating the
differences in approach. In generative grammar, the various representations are not
meant to be interpreted dynamically as involving processes in which one representa-
tion changes into another in real time. As Pullum (2013) cautions, even if we do adopt
a mentalistic interpretation of grammar constructions, two structural descriptions (or
trees), pre-movement and after-movement, are meant to be represented simultane-
ously not sequentially as in DS. But from a scientific modelling perspective, under a
structural realist interpretation, there is continuity between the model-structures and
the strategies used in these cases to model the particular linguistic phenomenon.29
9 Conclusion
It might be useful at this juncture to consider why this research (and the like) should be
of particular importance or interest within and outwith the field of linguistics. Linguis-
tics is in a relative scientific adolescence, often lacking a clear unified methodology,
theoretical persuasion or direction. The dominance of the generative programme is
under increased scrutiny and there is a plenitude of frameworks waiting in the wings
to take its place. On the one extreme, divergences are often exaggerated and these
frameworks are considered to be incommensurable (in the Kuhnian sense). On the
other extreme, genuine differences are overlooked and considered to be mere ‘nota-
tional variants’ of one another (in the Chomskyan sense). The present work hopes to
find a middle ground in the identification of commonalities in terms of scientific mod-
elling practices, while respecting genuine theoretical advancements and divergences.
I have argued that the generative tradition more broadly encompasses two related
varieties of modelling, namely minimal determination and isolation. These modelling
29 Of course, much more needs to be said about the specifics of the structural realist proposal at hand. Is it
“content” or “vehicle” structural realism?, What exactly are structures?, etc. Unfortunately, such a task is
well beyond the present purview.
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strategies fall under the auspices of a modelling practice commonly found in the sci-
ences, namely minimalist idealisation as described by (Weisberg 2007, 2013). Under
this paradigm, linguists aim to identify a core (minimal) basis which gives rise to a
property or phenomenon of interest while ignoring other (even potentially relevant)
features of the target system. In this sense, the strategy involves a distortion or ide-
alisation of the target system in order to capture the least set of elements responsible
for a given property. Following a line set by Blutner (2011) and Tomalin (2010), I
extended this analysis beyond the standard accounts within generative grammar such
as Government and Binding and the Minimalist program, to include Jackendoff’s par-
allel architecture and optimality theory of Prince and Smolenksy. Lastly, I attempted
to unite the modelling practices of the generative tradition with a competing approach
which lacks the similar theoretical underpinnings of the parallel architecture and OT,
namely the dynamic syntax of Kempson et al. (2001). I argued that although the theo-
retical claims of this latter framework are genuinely distinct from those of the specific
generative programmes, they approach the target system of natural language in simi-
lar ways via minimalist modelling strategies. For the sake of contrast, I presented an
overview of linguistic frameworks which do not share this modelling approach.
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